We consider a memoryless single server queue in which users can purchase relative priority so as to reduce their expected waiting costs which are linear with time. Relative priority is given in proportion to a price paid by customers present in the system. For two service disciplines, (weighted) processor sharing and (weighted) random entrance, we find the unique pure and symmetric Nash equilibrium price paid by the customers.
Introduction
In this paper we consider the issue of equilibrium strategies in purchasing relative priority in two queueing systems. The first one is a weighted M/M/1 processor sharing (PS) queue.
Specifically, customers (or jobs) arrive to a single server queue in accordance with a Poisson process with rate A. Each of them requires service which follows an exponential distribution with an expected value of It-1 • Let p = AIfl and assume that p < 1. Also, without loss of generality assume that /\ + p = 1. The server shares its capacity between all customers present in the system proportionally to a price they pay upon arrival. 3 Specifically, if at a given instant 11. customers are present and the i-th customer paid a nonnegative amount .1:j, 1 :::; i :::; 11., then the processor dedicates XJ"£j=1 Xj of its capacity to the i-th customer.
A cost of C is inflicted on each customer per unit of time that he is in the system. The system is assumed to be in steady-state and all of the above is common knowledge among customers.
The second system is similar to the first with respect to random variables and parameters involved. However, in this model the processor serves customers one at a. time until their service has been completed. Priority purchasing is as in the PS model and the next customer to enter service is selected from all those present in the line with probabilities which are proportiona.l to the prices they paid. Specifically, if at some service completion 11. customers are present and the i-th customer paid a nonnegative amount of Xi, 1 :::; i :::; 11., then he commences service with probability Xi/Y:.j=1 Xj. where
(1)
In each of the two models described above, each of the customers has to decide on how much to pay in order to minimize his total expected costs (i.e., priority charges plus the cost of being delayed in the system). Note that upon arrival a customer does not have any further information. All he knows is that he enters an M/M/1 processor sharing queue with relative priorities with mean service time 1/Il, utilization p and costs C per unit of time spent in the system. He does not know his own servive time, nor the number of customers in the system, let alone the payments they made. Since customers' optimal price is a function of the payments made (and to be made) by others, the solution concept to adopt here is the (symmetric) Nash equilibrium. In other words, we look for an identical across customers payment strategy so that when it is followed by all, no individual has any incentive to deviate from it to some oHler strategy. Note that customers have to pay a single price but a policy can prescribe some randomization (with a specific distribution) over a set of prices. However, if no randomization is used and indeed all pay the same amount, the strategy is said to be pure.
while in the random queue it is
In this paper we find for both models the unique pure Nash equilibrium strategy. Specifically, we show that in the PS model this price is
The issue of queues with priorities, in particular, how much customers have to pay in order to gain priority, has received a lot of attention in the literature. See, e.g., [6] , [2] , [3] , [7] , [4] and [5] . However, all papers we know of assume the purchasing of absolute priority.
For example, in [4] , a similar model is looked at but there, the next to enter service among those present in the system is the one who paid the most (regardless on how much more he paid). In case of a tie, first come first served is assumed. It is worthwhile to note here that in [4] it is shown that the resulting Nash equilibrium strategy prescribes mixing such that all select a price p when p is a nonnegative random variable whose cumulative distribution
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(6) and for all 0 < x < 00
In fact we have
In this section we prove that in the weighted processor sharing system, the price stated in
(1) uniquely defines a Nash equilibrium price paid by all customers. This will be done via a series of lemmas. First, for 11. 2: 0, let f( 11., x) be the expected sojourn time of a customer who pays x when everybody else pays the amount of 1, when he finds himself with 11. other customers in the system. Define f( -1, x) arbitrarily. It is easy to see that for x = 0 the expected sojourn time, f(n, 0), is the expected sum of 11.+ 1 busy periods and that for x = 00 the customer receives absolute priority, so Proof. At some time which we refer to as time zero, tag a customer who pays x when everybody else pays 1 in the following two cases. The first case is when the tagged customer is with 11. other customers and the second is when he is with m other customers. Suppose one more customer is added to the system (in both cases). Of course, what the lemma says is t.ha.t the added expected sojourn times inflicted on the tagged customer are identical.
In order to argue that, suppose service is given in a weighted round-robin fashion, namely for some (small) quantum 6, the server, in a cyclical order, dedicates its capacity for an amount of time 6 to each of the other customers and then serves the tagged customer for an amount of time x6. This is repeated again and again until the tagged customer departs. We claim that the waiting times inflicted by the additional customer on the tagged customer are statistically identical in the two systems under the weighted round-robin scheme. Indeed, A(x) = and B(x) = .
l+x-p~l+x-pP roof. Follows directly by substituting (7) with these value of A(x) and B(x) into (6).0.
Proof. Upon arrival the :l:-customer sees n 2 0 customers in the system with probability consider the service time of the added customer, of the service times of those who arrive during his service, the service times of those who arrive during their periods of service, etc.
The tagged customer may be present during some of andlor part of these periods~ut his added time in the system due to that has identical distribution regardless of how ma.ny are present in the system at time zero. Finally, look at the expected sojourn time inflicted by the added customer when .6. goes to zero. This is exactly the value of A(:r). o.
As we see g(l) = 1/((1-p)~), which is the expected sojourn time in an MIMII PS system when all share the same priority level. Also, when :r goes to infinity, g( x) goes to l/ll. Finally, for x = 0, the expected sojourn time 1/(~(1 -p)2) is the expected time from the arrival of an arbitrary customer to an M/M/l queue until the server is idle for the first time.
which, by some straightforward algebra, is shown to equal (9). The convexity of g(x) is straightforward. o. 
C=Il(1-p)(2-p) , p
Proof. Suppose all customers pay the price of 1. The value of C for which paying 1 is optimal follows from (11) 
-PJl
As before we can argue that
•1: See Appendix B for a proof for this claim. For example, if v( x) equilibrium payment is
2-p 1-p It
In this section we prove that for the weighted random queue, the price stated in (2) uniquely defines a Nash equilibrium price paid by all customers. The technique used here, as well as the results, are similar to those for the previous model. The same is the case with the equilibrium problem looked at in [1] . Our main result is obtained again via a series of lemmas. First, for 11. 2:: 0, let 11.(11., x) be the expected queueing time for a customer who pays :r when everybody else pays the amount of 1, when he finds himself with 11. other customers in the queue. Note that we assume here that the server is busy serving a customer. Define
and that for all°< x < 00
Also, it is easy to see that 11.(n, x), 17 2: 0, satisfies the following difference equation:
So the equations for 11. are the same as the ones for f. Remains to argue that the solution we are looking for js the same as well. Proof. Tag a. customer who pays x when everybody else pays 1. Let B*( x) be his expected queueing time in the case that he a.rrives to find a system with a busy server and a.n empty queue and let A*(x) be his additional expected queueing time in case that he arrives to a system with one waiting customer. 'vVe refer to the waiting customer as the other customer.
We next argue that B*(x) = (1 + x)A*(x). Indeed, with probability x/(1 + x), the tagged customer overta.kes the other customer. Conditioning on that, his expected queueing time is B*(x). 'vVith the complement probability, 1/(1 + x), he does not overtake him. His condi tional expected queueillg time is then 2B* (x). This is the case since the time it takes to clear the system from the customer in service, and from those who arrive during his service and overtake the tagged customers, and from those who arrive during their service periods and overtake the tagged customer, etc., is statistically identical with the corresponing period which initializes from the service commencement of the second customer. Simple unconditioning of conditional expected values shows that A*(x) = B*(x)/(l + x). A similar argument shows that the additional expected queueing time inflicted on the tagged customer in case that he finds a queue of size 11. + 1 in comparison with a queue of size n is A*(x), regardless of the value of 11., 11. 2: 0, the additional customer has a probability of 1/(1 + ;1:) to overtake the tagged customer and to inflict an additional waiting time of B(x) (and a probability of x/(1 + x) to have no effect). This completes our proof for the affinity of the l+x-p I-PIt Proof. Conditioning on having a busy server (a probability p event), the :r-customer finds n~0 customers in the queue upon his arrival with probability (1 -p)pn. Hence, vvhich equals (17). D.
Remark 4. It is easy to see that w(l) = pl(p (1 -p) ), which is the expected queueing time in an MIMII random queue when all share the same priority level. Also, when x goes to infinity, w(:r) goes to pi~which is the expected time from an arrival of an arbitrary customer to an iVIIiVIII queue until the server completes the serivce of the one who is currently in service (if there is one there). Finally, when x = athe expected queueing time is pl(p(1-p)2)
which is the expected time from an arrival of an arbitrary customer to an 1'1I!viII queue until the queue is empty for the first time. where w( x) is given in (17). This is exactly as above in (11) but with C p replacing C. Hence,
It(l -p)(2 -p) C p = ------p
Immediate change of scale concludes our proof. D.
